






Whose Reason, Whose Law, Whose Public?
“The Political” and “Hegemonic Sovereignty” in Carl Schmitt
Abstract
Carl Schmitt is one of the most dedicated opponents of liberal universalism, with its notion 
of pluralist, rational and non-exclusivist consensus politics as a progressive democratic 
project and its understanding of the political arena – “purified”, being free from strug-
gles and conflict – as the progressive move of democratic logic. In this paper I will first 
try to show Schmitt’s pessimistic and negative stance based on ontological and theological 
grounds on the deliberative model of politics with its claim about the possibility of mak-
ing particular wills reach the conception of common public interest or the common good 
through discussion and dialogue. Secondly, I’ll try to show that, within Schmitt’s project, 
the concept of the sovereign dictatorship exists as the necessary counterpoint to the con-
cept of the political. Schmitt refuses to understand political life as a medium of dialogue 
leading to a rational consensus. In this context, the sovereign in Schmitt’s theory should 
be precisely understood as a force constructed to reproduce homogeneity in a hegemonic 
manner. Hegemonia, in a Gramscian sense, is not a bare oppressive force. Rather, it refers 
to a ruling force which is able to inject its own ideology and world view into the public 
through persuasion. In this framework, leftist thinkers like mouffe, who recommended that 
we should think “with Schmitt against Schmitt” in order to develop a new democratic politi-
cal understanding, draw attention to Schmitt’s thesis that every political identity functions 
as “we-they” antinomy, yet they miss the fact that it is impossible to deduce a conception 
of a truly democratic public sphere from Schmitt’s theory. As it will be emphasized in this 
paper, democracy in the Schmittian sense can be the perfect form of sovereignty, one which 
in contrast to liberal democracy results in homogenization and the exclusion of the hetero-
geneous and thus must be conceived as a fundamentally hegemonic system. The Schmittian 
ideal of democracy requires that political identities, public opinion, public sphere and will 
formation are the products of a sovereign will and not of open and free discussion.
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Undoubtedly,	 it	was	 this	 discovery	 of	 the	 political	 by	 Schmitt	 that	 can	 be	




a	serious	challenge	 to	 the	Enlightenment	hope	 that	reason	organized	in	 the	
right	way	will	be	able	to	create	a	better	life	for	people,	and	a	better	forms	of	
association	if	it	makes	it	necessary	to	distinguish	between	friend	and	enemy.	










































can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 ancient	 Greeks.	
However,	 the	 Schmittian	 conception	 of	 the	
political	 was	 the	 endeavor	 to	 resurrect	 the	
meaning	of	the	political	in	Hobbessian	frame-
work	against	the	ancient	Greeks	who	sought	
to	 understand	 human	 being	 as	 a	 zoon poli-
tikon.	Some	years	before	his	death,	he	wrote	
to	G.	L.	Ulmen	that	“I’m	no	Hobbes,	but,	like	












in	 the	 context	 of	 political	 crisis	 of	 the	Wei-
mar	period,	I	would	like	to	say	that	his	ideas	
and	works	would	remain	unintelligible	if	they	







called	 this	 Schmittian	 ontology	 as	 “non-ob-
jectivist	 political	 ontology”	 that	 investigates	
–	on	the	level	of	concrete	political	existence	
–	to	what	extent	is	it	possible	to	measure	the	
“humanness”	 (humanity)	 of	 the	 human	 by	
the	potentiality,	the	possibility	and	the	inten-
sity	 of	 its	 “implementation”	 (embodiment)	
(Marder	2010:	1–4).
3
Schmitt’s	The Concept of the Political	starts	
with	 the	 sentence	 “the	 concept	 of	 the	 state	
presupposes	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 Political”.	






In	manifesto of the Communist Party,	Marx	
and	Engels’s	saying	“the	history	of	all	hith-
erto	 existing	 society	 is	 the	 history	 of	 class	
struggles”	 argue	 that	 bringing	 an	 end	 to	 the	
power	of	 the	bourgeoisie	would	be	possible	




Although	 the	 relationship	 between	Marxism	
and	Democracy	is	a	very	complicated	issue,	it	
can	be	maintained	uncontroversially	 that	 for	

























liberal	 state	 by	 supplementing	Marx’s	 theory	 –	 centering	 on	 the	 economic	
–	with	Schmitt’s	political	theory	focused	on	the	genuine	meaning	of	the	po-
litical	(Telman	2001:	128–129).	Chantal	Mouffe’s	proposal	to	think	“against	
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Precisely	because	of	this	narrow	perspective,	it	was	unable	to	explain	struc-
tural	 transformations	 of	modernity,	 such	 as	multiculturalism,	 globalization	
of	economy,	transnational	forms	of	governance,	globalization	of	information	
technologies	–	processes	described	by	political	sciences	at	the	end	of	the	Cold	
War	 and	 the	dissolution	of	 the	Soviet	System,	which	 resulted	 in	questions	












































































founding	 uncertainty.	The	 political	 is	 the	 constitutive	 event	 (grundlegende 
Ereignis).	Because	the	political	is	by	nature	an	event,	it	necessarily	involves	
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–	 instead	of	democracy	–	a	kind	of	 sovereignty	 theory	which	can	 suspend	
the	law	in	effect	on	the	grounds	that	the	political,	which	emerges	in	the	form	
of	difference	between	 friend	and	enemy,	 is	 a	possibility	 immanent	 to	 civil	
society.	Therefore,	as	Strauss	and	Kalyvas	point	out,	he	cannot	introduce	to	
















































Difficult	 problem	 of	 complex	 interrelations	











stitution	 vs.	 law).	 Consequently,	 the	 acceptance	 by	 Schmitt	 of	 democratic	



























because	in	his	view	the	principles	of	rational deliberation, public negotiation, 













Certainly,	 perpetual	 consistency	 renders	 politics	 unnecessary	 but	 perpetual	
inconsistency	 renders	 politics	 impossible	 to	 the	 same	degree.	Because	 cir-
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Čiji razum, čiji zakon, čija javnost?
»Političko« i hegemonijski suverenitet kod Carla Schmitta
Sažetak
Carl Schmitt je jedan od najposvećenijih protivnika liberalnog univerzalizma sa svojim poj-
mom pluralističke, racionalne i uključive konsenzualne politike kao progresivnog demokratskog 
projekta i svojeg razumijevanja političke arene kao pročišćene, od sukoba slobodne, i na taj 
način progresivne kretnje demokratske logike. U ovom radu nastojat ću pokazati Schmittove 
pesimističke i negativne stavove, zasnovane na ontološkim i teološkim temeljima, o deliberativ-
nom modelu politike koja tvrdi da partikularna volja može doći do koncepta zajedničkog javnog 
interesa ili zajedničkog dobra kroz raspravu i dijalog. Nadalje, pokušat ću pokazati da unutar 
Schmittovog projekta koncept diktature suverena postoji kao nužni kontrapunkt pojmu politič-
kog. Schmitt odbija razumijevati politički život kao medij dijalog koji vodi razumskom konsen-
zusu. U ovom kontekstu, suveren iz Schmittove teorije mora se razumijevati upravo kao sila 
napravljena da proizvodi homogenost kroz hegemoniju. Hegemonija, u Gramscijevom smislu, 
nije gola opresivna sila. Namjesto toga, odnosi se na vladajuću silu sposobnu upisati vlastitu 
ideologiju i pogled na svijet u javnost kroz uvjeravanje. U tom okviru, ljevičarski mislitelji poput 
Mouffea, koji preporuča da moramo misliti »sa Schmittom protiv Schmitta« kako bismo razvili 
novo demokratsko političko razumijevanje, svraćaju pozornost na Schmittovu tezu da je svaki 
politički identitet u funkciju »mi–oni« antinomije, ali im promiče činjenica da je nemoguće de-
ducirati koncept zbiljski demokratske javne sfere iz Schmittove teorije. Kao što će biti naglašenu 
u radu, demokracija u Schmittovom smislu može biti savršena forma suverenosti, takva kakva 
usuprot liberalnoj demokraciji rezultira homogenizacijom i isključenjem heterogenosti, te na 
taj način mora biti začeta kao fundamentalno hegemonijski sistem. Schmittov ideal demokracije 
zahtijeva da politički identiteti, javno mišljenje, javna sfera i formiranje volje vudu rezultati 




Wessen Vernunft, wessen Recht, wessen Öffentlichkeit?
„Das Politische“ und die hegemoniale Souveränität bei Carl Schmitt
Zusammenfassung
Carl Schmitt ist einer der mächtigsten Gegner des liberalen Universalismus mit dessen Vorstel-
lung von pluralistischer, rationaler und nicht exklusivistischer Konsenspolitik als einem pro-
gressiven demokratischen Projekt und dessen Verständnis der politischen Arena – „gereinigt“, 
frei von Kämpfen und Konflikten – als eines progressiven Schritts der demokratischen Logik. 
In diesem Beitrag werde ich zunächst versuchen, Schmitts pessimistische, negative und auf on-
tologischer und theologischer Grundlage ruhende Haltung zum Beratungsmodell der Politik 
darzulegen, mit dessen Behauptung über die möglichkeit, partikulare Willen zu veranlassen, 
durch Diskussion und Dialog die Konzeption des gemeinschaftlichen öffentlichen Interesses 
oder Gemeinwohls zu erreichen. Zweitens werde ich versuchen zu zeigen, dass im Rahmen des 
schmittschen Projekts der Begriff der souveränen Diktatur als notwendiger Kontrapunkt zum 
Begriff des Politischen existiert. Schmitt weigert sich, das politische Leben als ein medium 
des Dialogs zu begreifen, das zu einem rationalen Konsens führt. In diesem Zusammenhang 
soll das Souveräne in der schmittschen Theorie eben als eine Gewalt aufgefasst werden, die 
konstruiert ist, um eine solche Homogenität in einer hegemonialen Art zu reproduzieren. Die 
hegemonia im gramscischen Sinne ist nicht eine bloß repressive Kraft; vielmehr bezieht sie 
sich auf eine herrschende Kraft, die imstande ist, durch Überzeugungsvermögen ihre eigene 
Ideologie und Weltanschauung in die Öffentlichkeit zu injizieren. Linksorientierte Denker wie 
mouffe, die empfohlen haben, wir sollten „mit Schmitt gegen Schmitt“ denken, um ein neues 
demokratisches politisches Verständnis zu entwickeln, lenken in diesem Kontext das Augenmerk 
auf Schmitts These, jede politische Identität funktioniere durch die „wir – sie“-Antinomie, doch 
sie übersehen die Tatsache, dass es unmöglich ist, aus der schmittschen Theorie die Vorstellung 
von einer wahrhaft demokratischen öffentlichen Sphäre abzuleiten. Wie es in dieser Arbeit be-
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tont wird, kann die Demokratie im schmittschen Sinne die perfekte Form der Souveränität sein, 
die – im Gegensatz zur liberalen Demokratie – in der Homogenisierung und Ausgrenzung des 
Heterogenen resultiert und daher als ein grundlegend hegemoniales System erachtet werden 
muss. Das schmittsche Ideal der Demokratie erheischt, dass politische Identitäten, öffentliche 
meinung, öffentliche Sphäre und Willensbildung keine Produkte einer offenen und freien Dis-





À qui la raison, à qui la loi, à qui le public?
La souveraineté « politique » et hégémonique chez Carl Schmitt
Résumé
Carl Schmitt est l’un des opposants les plus puissants de l’universalisme libérale de par sa 
notion de consensus politique pluraliste, rationnel et non exclusiviste en tant que projet démo-
cratique progressiste, mais aussi de par sa compréhension de l’arène politique - « purifiée », 
libre de toutes luttes et de tout conflit – en tant que mouvement progressiste de la logique dé-
mocratique. Dans cet article, je vais en premier lieu tenter de montrer l’opinion pessimiste et 
négative de Schmitt – basée sur des fondements ontologiques et théologiques – concernant le 
modèle délibératif de la politique et sa prétention à penser que la formation de volontés par-
ticulières pourrait toucher l’intérêt public commun ou le bien commun à travers la discussion 
et le dialogue. En second lieu, je vais tenter de montrer qu’à l’intérieur du projet de Schmitt le 
concept de dictature souveraine existe comme contrepartie nécessaire au concept du politique. 
Schmitt refuse de penser la vie politique comme instrument de dialogue menant au consensus 
rationnel. Ainsi, le souverain dans la théorie de Schmitt doit précisément être compris comme 
une force construite pour reproduire une telle homogénéité de manière hégémonique. Hegemo-
nia, au sens gramscien, n’est pas une simple force oppressive ; il s’agit plutôt d’un terme qui se 
réfère à une force dirigeante capable d’injecter sa propre idéologie et vision du monde dans le 
domaine public à travers la persuasion. Dans ce contexte, certains penseurs de gauche telle que 
mouffe qui nous recommande de penser « avec, et contre, Schmitt » dans le but de développer 
une nouvelle compréhension de la politique démocratique, attirent notre attention sur la thèse 
de Schmitt où chaque identité politique fonctionne par l’antinomie « nous/eux ». Toutefois, ces 
penseurs passent à côté du fait qu’il est impossible de déduire une conception de réelle sphère 
publique démocratique sur la base de la théorie de Schmitt. Comme cet article le souligne bien, 
la démocratie au sens schmittien peut être la forme parfaite de souveraineté, une forme qui – en 
contraste avec la démocratie libérale – aboutit à une homogénéisation en excluant l’hétérogé-
néité, et ainsi doit être conçue comme un système fondamentalement hégémonique. Selon l’idéal 
schmittien de démocratie, les identités politiques, l’opinion publique, la sphère publique et la 
formation de volontés doivent être les produits, non pas d’une discussion ouverte et libre, mais 
d’une volonté souveraine.
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